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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
State of U tab 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. No. 7273 
ROBERT S. HARRIES, 
Defendant and Appellant 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant and appellant herein was indicted 
by a grand jury of Salt Lake County, Utah, June 26, 
1948, for the commission of the crime of receiving a 
bribe as an executive officer of this state, under the pro-
visions of section 103-26-4, Utah Code Annodated 1943. 
( Tr. 1) To this indictment, he entered a plea of not guil-
ty (Tr. 6), was tried before a jury in the third judicial 
district court in and .for Salt Lake County (Tr. 16), was 
found guilty of the crime of bribery as charged in the 
indictment, and is before this Court on appeal from that 
verdict, and the judgment and sentence based thereon. 
Defendant makes forty-two assignments of error 
occurring at the trial, as set forth in his brief, pages 14 
l. 
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to 22. We have grouped them for reply as will appear in 
the argument. 
ARGUMENT 
PROPOSITION I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO EROR IN 
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO INSPECT 
AND COPY THE TRANSCRIPT OF TESTIMONY 
BEFORE THE GRAND JURY, AND TO GRANT A 
CONTINUANCE UNTIL AFTER SUCH INSPEC-
TION. 
Defendant assigns as errors Nos. 1 and 2, the re-
fusal of the district court to order the clerk of the court 
to make available to the defense for the purpose of in-
spection and copying the transcript of proceedings be-
fore the grand jury, and to grant a continuance until af-
ter inspection by defense counsel of that transcript. Ap-
parently defendant's theory is that one indicted has such 
a right. We respectfully submit that no such right exists, 
and such a theory misconceives the function of a grand 
JUry. 
At common law the grand jury's province is to hear 
the state's case; it is an informing and accusing body 
only, and is under duty to hear evidence only on the part 
of the prosecution. State v. Bramlett, 164 S. E. 873, 166 
S. C. 323. Evidence taken before a grand jury is a confi-
dential matt'er to which the accused has no right of ac-
cess. Goodman v. United States (C. C. A.-9, 1939) 108 F. 
(2d) 516, 127 A. L. R. 265. 
In the case of Havenor v. State, 125 Wise. 444, 104 
N. W. 116, the Wisconsin court held that one accu'sed of 
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a crin1e is not entitled to inspect before trial the records 
of the grand jury in order to enable him to prepare for 
trial or to lay a· foundation to in1peach a witness who 
testified before the grand jury. In the case of People v. 
Macner, 13 N. Y. S. (2d) 451, 171 Misc. 720, the court 
stated: 
•'The defendant states in his moving affidavit 
that he seeks an inspection of the Grand Jury Min-
utes in order to prepare for trial. The law is well 
settled that an inspection 'vill not be granted for 
such purpose. (case~ cited) '' 
It may be noted from the affidavit and motion of de-
fense counsel (Tr. 13-15) that defendant asserts a right 
to inspect the minutes of the grand jury in order to pre-
pare for trial. See also defendant's assignment of error 
No. 2 (Defendant's brief p. 15), and argument of coun-
sel on this point (Defendant's brief p. 23-24). 
Defendant relies on sections 105-19-9 and 105-19-10, 
Utah Code Annotated 1943, as amended by Chapter 13, 
Laws of Utah 1947. Section 105-19-9 provides that two 
copies only shall be made of grand jury proceedings, one 
of which is filed with the clerk of the court and one of 
which is delivered to the district attorney. Section 105-
19-10 provides that the proceedings shall be kept secret, 
with two exceptions : 
"No member of the Grand Jury, nor any pe.rson at 
any time present at any session of the Grand Jury, 
shall disclose what he himself or any other grand 
juror or person may have said at such session. 
No grand juror shall divulge in what manner he or 
any other grand juror may have voted on a matter 
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before them; any grand juror or other person. may, 
however, be required by any court to disclose the 
testimony of a witness examined before the Grand 
Jury, for the purpose of ascertaining whether it is 
consistent with that given by the witness before the 
Court, or to disclose the testimony given before the 
Grand Jury by any person upon a charge against 
such person for perjury in giving his testimony, or 
upon his trial therefor." 
· It would thus appear the legislature intended that 
the proceedings may be divulged in two instances; first, 
to impeach a witness, and second, in case perjury be-
fore the grand jury is charged. Defendant admits ac-
cess to the transcript for purposes of impeachment (De-
fendant's brief p. 24) and the question of perjury is not 
before the court in this matter. 
The common-law rule preserving the secrecy of 
grand jury proceedings is modified only to the extent in-
dicated by statute. State v. McDonald, 119 S. W. (2d) 
286, 342 Mo. 998. 
The responsibility for relaxing the rule of secrecy 
of grand jury proceedings, where it may be relaxed, re-
sides in the trial court of which the grand jury is a part, 
and such rna tter resides in that court's discretion. 
Schmidt v. United States, (C. C. A. 6, 1940) 115 F. (2d) 
394. We submit, first, that the trial court had no power 
in this case to grant defendant access to the transcript 
of grand jury proceedings, and second, that if the statute 
may be construed to grant such power, there is no show-
ing of abuse of the trial court's discretion in denying 
such access. 
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
It follows neeessarily that as defendant had no right 
of access to the transcript of grand jury proceedings, 
there 'vas no error in denying defendant's motion for a 
continuance in order to inspect such transcript. 
PROPOSITION II 
THE DENYING OF THE MOTION FOR A CONTIN-
UANCE UNTIL .A.FTER THE GENERAL ELECTION 
WAS NOT ERROR. 
The record shows the indictment found June 26, 1948 
(Tr. 1 and 2), that a bench warrant issued and defend-
ant was arrested June 26, 1948 (Tr. 3), and that on July 
10, 1948, defendant 'Yas arraigned, entered his plea, and 
trial was set for September 13, 1948. (Tr. 6) 
The motion for a continuance until after the election 
(Tr. 15), together with supporting affidavit (Tr. 13-14) 
was filed with the clerk of the court on September 13, 
1948, and a minute entry (Tr. 16) shows that it was pre-
sented to the court and submitted without argument on 
the morning of the trial. It would appear that the with-
holding of such a motion until the jury panel is present 
and the case is. ready to go to trial would indicate the 
motion was not taken too seriously by counsel at that 
time. 
Section 105-30-1, Utah Code Annotated 1943, pro-
vides as follows : 
"When an action is called for trial, or at any time 
previous thereto, the court may, upon sufficient 
cause shown by either party by affidavit, direct the 
trial to be postponed to another day of the same or 
of the next term. But the court shall not postpone 
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the trial for a longer time than may be necessary.'' 
This and previous statutes similar thereto have been 
construed several times by this court. The general rule 
is that the granting of a continuance in a criminal case 
is discretionary with the trial court, and its refusal to 
grant a continuance is not reversible error unless clearly 
prejudicial. State v. Willims 16~ Pac. 1104, 49 U. 320, 
State v. Freshwater 85 Pac. 447, 30 U. 442, 116 Am. St. 
Rep. 853, State v. Fairclough, 44 Pac. (2d) 692, 86 U. 326, 
State v. Hartman 119 Pac. (2d) 112, 101 U. 298. 
At the time the motion was made, there was no af-
firmative showing that defendant would be prejudiced by 
going to trial at that time. The motion states merely 
"* * That the trial of this cause be continued and post-
poned until after the general election next ensuing.'' 
(Tr. 15) The affidavit in support thereof makes a gen-
eral allegation that there was at the time ''great aggita-
tion and controversy", and that therefore the affiant be-
lieved defendant could not receive a fair and impartial 
trial. The motion was submitted without argument. We 
respectfully submit that the record shows nothing at the 
time the motion for continuance was made, to warrant 
a continuance or to constitute the denial of the motion 
prejudicial error. 
We further submit that the defendant did not show 
proper diligence in moving for a continuance. This court, 
in the case of State v. Freshwater, supra, held that there 
was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in refusing 
a continuance where the moving party showed lack of 
diligence. While the facts of that case differ fro1n this, 
we believe the same principle applies. The trial here was 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
held forty-eight days after the arrest was n1ade and 
thirty-four days after the arraignment and plea. No mo-
tion \Yas filed until the n1orning of the trial, and it was 
then subn1itted 'vithout argu1nent. We believe the court 
committed no error in denying the n1otion, particularly in 
view of the delay in filing thereof. 
PROPOSITION III 
THE TRIAL COURT CO~{MITTED NO ERROR BY 
REASON OF ITS RULINGS UPON MATTERS OF 
EVIDENCE. 
Appellant has grouped assignments of error, num-
bers 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 
.20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, . 30 and 31, under 
the general proposition that the court committed error in 
admitting conversations out of the presence of the de-
fendant between Lack and diverse other persons, Ossana 
and his partner, Myers, and others which appellant con-
tends has no reference to the matter charged in the in-
dictment. We will not disturb the appellant's grouping of 
these errors for the purpose of meeting his argument. 
It is an elementary proposition of law that the acts, dec-
larations, and confessions of one conspirator with third 
persons are admissible against a defendant co-conspirat-
or. This rule holds true whether or not the acts, declara-
tions or confessions were made in the defendant's pres-
ence or with or without defendant's knowledge. The evi-
dence which is admissible under this rule includes any-
thing said, written,, or done by any conspirator in furth-
erance of a common plan or purpose. State vs. De Ange-
les, 269 Pac. 515, 72 Utah 209; State vs. Gillies, 123 Pac. 
93, 40 Utah 541; People vs. Farrell, 40 Pac. 703, 11 Utah 
7. 
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414; State vs. McCurtain, 172 Pac. 481,52 Utah 63; State 
vs. Inlaw, 141 Pac. 530, 44 Utah 485; Rose vs. United 
States, (Calif.) 149 Fed. (2d) 755; State vs. Brown 53 
Idaho 576, 26 Pac. (2d) 131; State vs. Ingalls 4 Wash. 
(2d) 676, 104 Pac. (2d) 944. The rule is well stated in the 
case of People vs. Bunkers, 2 Cal. App. 197, 84 Pac. 364 
(370) in which the court held that where an accomplice 
and a witness entered into a conspiracy to procure money 
from third persons for accused, evidence of conversations 
between third persons was competent for the purpose of 
showing the source of the money and tracing it to the 
accused and for the. purpose of showing that the third 
persons were not accomplices. In applying the above 
rules the cases uniformly hold that they are applicable to 
all acts, declarations and admissions which are done in 
furtherance of the common conspiracy. 
The trial court submitted this case to the jury on the 
theory that in addition to the offense of bribery there 
was a conspiracy to violate the liquor laws between the 
defendant and those witnesses whose testimony is ob-
jected to by defendant. Proof of this conspiracy was 
necessary as an element of the offense of bribery as 
charged but it was not the offense charged. The defend-
ant was accused of accepting a bribe under section 103-
26-4, Utah Code Annotated 1943. A conspiracy to violate 
the liquor laws is not a part of the crime of bribery, 
therefore, these witnesses, while conspirators in the crime 
of violating the liquor laws, were not accomplices in the 
crime of bribery as charged in the indictment. State vs. 
W appenstein, 67 Wash. 502, 121 Pac. 989. The rule is also 
well stated in 1 Nichol's, Applied Evidence, page 302: 
''A test by which to determine whether one is an 
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acco1nplice, so as to require corroboration of his 
testin1ony, is to ascertain whether he could be in-
dicted for the offense for which the accused is be-
ing tried. ' ' 
In the W appenstein case, supra, at page 998 of 121 Paci-
fic Reporter, si1nilar objections were raised and the 
court very ably stated the law as to what constituted an 
accomplice within the meaning of the rule which re-
quires corroboration of an accomplice's testimony. 
"Finally; it is contended that the court erred in re-
fusing to give instructions requested by the defend-
ant as to the weight to be given to· the testimony of 
an accomplice and as to the necessity for corrobora-
tion of such testimony. These requests were based 
upon an assumption that Gerald and Tupper were ac-
complices of the defendant in the commission of the 
offense charged. They were not 'accomplices' with-
in the legal significance of that term. The appellant 
was charged with accepting a bribe from Gerald 
and Tupper, and as an element of the offense the 
corrupt agreement between the three was alleged. 
The corrupt agreement itself constituted an inde-
pendent crime-that of conspiracy. If the defend-
ant had been indicted for conspiracy, then Gerald 
and Tupper would have been accomplices in that 
crime. The conspiracy, however, was not a conspira-
cy to bribe an officer, but to conduct houses of pros-
titution in violation of law. While proof of the con-
spiracy was necessary as an element of the offense 
as charged, it was not the offense charged. The 
gravamen of the offense was soliciting and accepting 
a bribe. The giving or offering of a bribe and the so-
9· 
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liciting or receiving of a bribe are two distinct crimes 
defined and made punishable by separate sections of 
the statute. These sections, so far as here material, 
are as follows : 
'' 'Every person who * • • shall give, offer or prom-
ise, directly or indirectly, any compensation, gratu-
ity or reward to a person executing any of the func-
tio;ns of a public officer other than as hereinbefore 
specified, with intent to influence him.with respect to 
any act, decision, vote or other procee~ing in the ex-
ercise of his powers or functions, shall be punished 
by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for not 
more than ten years, or by a fine of not more than 
five thousand dollars, or by both.' Section 2320, Rem. 
& Bal. Code. 
" 'Every executive or administrative officer or per-
son elected or appointed to an executive or admini-
strative office who shall ask or receive, directly or 
indirectly, any compensation, gratuity or reward, or 
any promise thereof, upon an agreement or under-
standing that his vote, opinion or action upon any 
matter then pending, or which may by law be brought 
before him in his official capacity, shall be influ-
enced thereby; * * * shall be punished by imprison-
ment in the state penitentiary for not more than ten 
years, or by a fine of not more than five thousand 
dollars, or by both.' Section 2321, Rem. & Bal. Code. 
''The prosecution was based upon the latter of these 
sections, and it is plain that neither Tupper nor Ger-
ald could have been indicted under that section or 
for the crimes therein defined either as principal or 
accessory. This is obvious since the section applies 
I 
10 
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only to public officers, and the statute itself in the 
prior section has declared the acts of which Tupper 
and Gerald were guilty to constitute a separate and 
distinct crin1e. The true test to determine whether 
a witness is an accomplice or not is: Could the wit-
ness hiinself have been indicted either as principal 
or accessory for the crin1e charged and under invest-
igation? If he could not, he is not an accomplice. 
l\fanifestly, under that test Tupper and Gerald were 
not accomplices; neither had received a bribe, neith-
er was a public officer. * * * '' 
Section 103-26-3, Utah Code Annotated 1943, pro-
vides: 
"Every person who gives or offers any bribe to 
any executive officer, or to any peace offic~r or to 
any person authorized to enforce the law in this 
state, with intent to influence him in respect to any 
act, decision, vote, opinion or other proceedings as 
such officer, or person authorized to enforce the 
law, is guilty of a felony." 
The defendant in this case was indicted under the 
provision of 103-26-4, Utah Code Annotated 1943, which 
provides: 
''Every executive officer, or person elected or ap-
pointed to an executive office, who asks, receives or 
agrees to receive any b.ribe, upon any agreement or 
understanding that his vote, opinion or action upon 
any matter then pending, or which may be.brought 
before him in his official capacity, shall be influ-
enced thereby is guilty of felony.'' 
These statutes are substantially t~e same as the statutes 
11 
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in the Wappenstein case and under the rule of that case 
the witnesses whose testimony is objected to were not 
accomplices of the defendant. It is apparent, therefore, 
that the witnesses referred to are conspirators with the 
defendant Harries, in liquor law violation, and their test-
imony is admissable against the defendant who is a co-
conspirator. However, they are not accomplices with the 
defendant in the crime of bribery and, therefore, their 
testimony does not need corroboration. Thus, it is clear 
that the objections raised by the appellant as to the ad-
mission of statements between Lack and others, and 
Ossana and others, are without merit. 
At the bottom of page 31 of appellant's brief, ap-
pellant lists twelve Utah cases without reference to the 
propositions for which they stand. Upon reading these 
cases, we find that they all lay down the rule that a con-
viction cannot be had on the testimony of an accomplice 
unless it is corroborated by other evidence which, in it-
self, tends to connect the defendant with the. commission 
of the offense charged. These cases go on to state the 
rule that corroboration is not sufficient if it merely 
shows commission of an offense or the circumstances 
thereof and that while the corroborator's evidence need 
not be sufficient of itself to support a conviction and 
need not corroborate an accomplice's testimony on every 
material point, it must in and of itself tend to connect 
the defendant with the commission of the offense and 
must be inconsistent with the defendant's innocence, and 
it is not enough that it cast a mere suspicion only upon 
him. We are in complete agreement with the law as 
stated by these cases. It is apparent that the trial court 
also so understood the law as evidenced by Instruction 
12 
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No. 5, which states in part : 
''And you are instructed that under the law a con-
viction cannot be had on the testilnony of an accom-
plice, unless he is corroborated by other evidence, 
which in itself and without the aid of the accomplice 
tends to connect the defendant with the commission 
of the offense, and if you find that the crime of bri-
bery has been committed, as charged in the indict-
ment, * * * and if in your determination of the facts 
from a consideration of all the evidence in the case 
you find Robert Harries is proved guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and in reaching this determina-
tion you base your findings of guilt upon any evi-
dence of a material fact from the testimony of either 
of these accomplices, you must then find from other 
evidence, independent of the testimony of Lack or 
Ossana, evidence which tends to connect the defend-· 
ant with the commission of the offense, as in the 
fore part of this instruction set forth; otherwise you 
must acq~ him. Such corroboration is not suf-
ficient if it merely shows the circumstances of the 
offense or the commission of the offense charged, or 
merely tends to cast a grave suspicion on the accused 
or is consistent with his innocense. 
"On the other hand the corroborating evidence need 
not be sufficient of itself to establish the guilt of the 
defendant, nor is it essential that ,the testimony of 
the accomplice be corroborated on every material 
point, but it must, tend to implicate hin1 in, and con-
nect him with, the commission of the offense 
charged.'' 
13 
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The trial court proceeded upon the theory that Lack 
and Ossana were accomplices as a matter of law if the 
·defendant, Harries, were found to be guilty of the crime 
charged. Under the Wappenstein case, supra, it is appar-
ent that even Lack and Ossana would fall within the 
same classification as the other witnesses to whom ap-
pellant objects and their testimony would not need cor-
roboration. However, if the trial court were in error in 
instructing the jury that Lack and Ossana were accom-
plices, whose testimony required corroboration, this error 
was manifestly in favor of the defendant inasmuch as the 
court required corroboration, where under the W appen-
stein ruling, it was not necessary. It is clear, however, 
that even under the trial court's interpretation that Lack 
and Ossana were accomplices, their testimony is most 
fully corroborated by the testimony of Myers, Nikas, the 
Hatsis Brothers, Bullock, Young and other witnesses. 
Assignment of error No. 4 covers the entire opening 
statement of the District Attorney (Tr. 65-98). The ob-
jections made to the opening statement by counsel for 
appellant during the trial were to those items treated 
above, i.e. conversations between Lack and Ossana and 
others. 
The opening statement is not ·evidence. State vs. 
Distef~no, 70 Utah 586, 262 Pac. 113. Its purpose is mere-
ly to outline the evidence. 
In the case of State vs. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 
Pac. (2d) 285, this court stated: 
"The purpose of an opening statement is to advise 
the jury of the facts relied upon and of the questions 
and issues involved, which the jury will have to de-
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termine, and to give then1 a general picture of the 
facts and the situations, so that they 'vill be able to 
understand the evidence._ Counsel should outline gen-
erally 'vhat he intends to prove, and should be al-
lowed considerable latitude. He should make a fair 
statement of the evidence, and the extent to which 
he may go is largely in the discretion of the trial 
court.'' 
It will be readily seen that the district attorney made 
no statement that does not fall within the spirit and the 
letter of this rule. Surely if the matters complained of 
were properly admitted in evidence, there was no error 
in outlining them in the opening statement. 
Appellant's assignments of error 32, 33 and 34 have 
to do with the court's rulings in sustaining the objec-
tion of the State to questions put to the witness, Lunt, 
on cross exanrination regarding what ''digging in'' was 
done. This matter of "digging in" arose from an anony-
mous letter sent from Helper, Utah, to Mr. Lunt, charg-
ing that the Enforcement Division was playing favorites 
among alleged liquor law violators and charging a cer-
tain "Harold L." with accepting pay-offs and turning 
a large portion thereof over to the head of the Enforce-
ment Division of the Liquor Commission. The State in-
troduced this letter into evidence and ~ir. Lunt testified 
on direct examination that he had a conversation with 
Mr. Harries about the letter and that he told Mr. Harries: 
''There are certain charges there that I think should 
be looked into and I want you to dig into this mat-
ter." (Tr. 584) 
On cross examination appellant's counsel attempted to 
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bring out, through witness Lunt, statements that were 
made by the defendant Harries. This was objected to as 
hearsay and improper examination. The objection was 
sustained and the appellant assigns the rulings sustain-
ing objections to this line of testimony as error. It seems 
apparent from the court's statements at the time the rul-
ings were made that the court was unusually liberal in 
allowing the appellant's counsel to go as ·far as he did 
in cross examination of this witness. On page 594 of the 
transcript, the court stated: 
"THE COURT: You are at liberty to have Mr. 
Lunt testify as to things he did and things that Mr. 
Harries probably did while they were, (in Price) in 
reference to this digging in as a matter of cross-
examination, but I believe it is improper t<;> permit 
Mr. Lunt to testify here as to what Mr. Harries told 
him. It would be hearsay and there is no oppo.rtu~ity 
of the State to cross-examine the veracity or the 
accuracy of the testimony given by somebody who is 
not subject to cross-examination.'' 
On page 597, the court stated: 
''THE COURT: I think you have the right, Mr. 
Woolley, to determine from Mr. Lunt what Mr. 
Harries and he did as to digging into this, but the 
conversation that they had with other men, I don't 
believe is proper for Mr. Lunt to reiterate here for 
the same reason as I indicated. 
''In other words, he is testifying for somebody 
else who it not appearing and may never appear. 
The objection is sustained. '' 
The ~ppellant cites as error the court's sustaining of 
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ihe objection of the State to the question put to the wit-
tess, Lunt, on cross-examination: 
"Q. And what occurred?" 
Tie witness ans,vered in the following manner: 
''Mr. Harries stated to the commission-" 
It is obvious, therefore, that the -witness, Lunt, was not 
atbmpting to testify as to what occurred but rather as 
to what the defendant, Harries, had said· on that occa-
sion and the objection to this answer falls within the rul-
ings of the court above mentioned. On page 600 of the 
transcript, the court again sustained the State's object-
tion to this line of testimony _and very ably set out the 
grounds on which such objections were sustained as fol-
lows: 
"THE. COURT: The objection is sustained. I 
think, Mr. Woolley, after all th~ cross-examination 
of Mr. Lunt is on the proposition of whether or not 
he told· Mr. Harries to dig in. It is not particularly 
how far they dug in or how far Mr. Harries even 
dug in, as far as this witness is concerned. You have 
the right to test his veracity and his credibility and 
to contradict or modify his testimony as to what 
he has testified on direct, and that to the effect that 
he told Mr. Harries, 'you look in to this rna tter. ' 
Now, I have let you go an awful long ways on that 
phase of the matter.'' 
We submit that the court did, in fact, let Mr. Woolley 
go a long way on this matter. 
Appellant's assignment of error No. 35 relates to the 
objection of the State to a question put to the defendant 
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on direct examination as to the nature of testimony cf 
one, Steve Nikas and his wife in a trial concerning the 
Diamanti knock-over at Price, lJtah. The questions were 
as follows: (Tr .. 714) 
'' Q. I don't think I asked you about the testi-
mony at the Diamanti trial in Price. State whet:ter 
or not one of the Nikas boys was a witness in favor 
of the State or the Utah Liquor Control Commission 
in that proceeding? 
A. Steve Nikas and his wife also testified for 
the State in that trial. 
Q. And what was the nature of their testimony? 
MR. ROBERTS: I object to this, your Honor, as 
being hearsay and immaterial. 
MR. ASHTON: They have never been witnesses 
in this case, Steve Nikas or his wife.'' 
There does not seem to be any question but what 
this was hearsay and immaterial as neither Steve Nikas 
nor his wife were witnesses in this proceeding, and an 
attempt here to have the defendant relate matters to 
which they testified at a Liquor Control Commission pro-
ceeding is manifestly immaterial and hearsay and the 
court very properly sustained the State's objection to 
this question. 
Appellant assigns as error No. 16, the court's sus-
taining of the State's objection to the question, ''Mr. 
Lack, will you now please tell the jury· the story of the 
burglary in your pharmacy.'' This question was the first 
question asked of ;Mr. Lack by defendant's counsel on 
cross examination. The State had made no reference 
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whatever to any burglary on direct examination. There 
was no foundation laid for such ·a question and it was 
,vholly outside the scope of the direct examination. There 
,vas no error in sustaining the State's objection to this 
question. 
PROPOSITION IV 
THE COURT CO~l~IITTED NO ERROR IN ITS IN-
STRUCTIONS TO THE JURY. 
Defendant assigns as error the refusal of the court 
to give certain requested instructions (Assignments of 
Error No. 37,38 and39). 
Under assignment of error No. 37, defendant argues 
that the court committed error in refusing to give the 
last paragraph of defendant's requested instruction No. 
1, sta~ed as follows : 
''And you are further instructed in this case that 
the statements or admissions of the defendant, the 
accused, are not sufficient with the testimony of an 
accomplice alone to warrant a conviction.'' ( Tr. 33) 
In its instruction No. 5, the court charged the Jury 
as follows: 
d * * * and you are instructed that under the law a 
conviction cannot be had on the testimony of an ac-
complice unless he is corroborated by other evidence 
which in itself and without the aid of the accomplice 
tends to connect the defendant with the commission 
of the offense* * *." (Tr. 43) 
We believe that the portion of instruction No. 5 quoted 
above, together with the remainder of that instruction, 
sufficiently covers the law involved in defendant's re-
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quested instruction No. 1 and that, therefore, there is no 
error in refusing to give defendant's requested instruc-
tion No. 1 verbatim. We take the rule to be that when 
members of the jury are fully and fairly instructed upon 
a subject, it is not error for the trial court to refuse de-
fendant's proposed in~tructions which are merely repe-
titious of the law in the instructions as given. People vs. 
Parchen 98 Pac. (2d) 1045, 37 Cal. ~pp. (2d) 215. The 
Utah court has followed this rule, stating that the trial 
court is not required to instruct in the same language as 
requested but should give a proper charge on the sub-
ject in its own language. State vs. Rosenberg, 35 Pac. 
(2d) 1004, 84 u. 402 .. 
Defendant assigns as error (Assignment of Error 
No. 38) refusal of the court to give his requested instruc-
tion No. 2. (Tr. 34) Without quoting the instruction as· 
requested, or the instruction as given, we respectfully 
submit that the court covered the law properly in its in-
struction No. 3 (Tr. 41) and instruction No. 6 (Tr. 44) 
and there was therefore no error in refusing to give the 
instruction as requested. State vs. Rosenberg, supra. 
Defendant assigns further as error (Assignment of 
Error No. 39) refusal of the court to give defendant's 
requested instruction No. 6 ( Tr. 38). This alleged error is 
not argued in defendant's brief, and we quite frankly 
are, at a loss to determine wherein refusal to give said 
requested instruction constitutes error. That is, we fail 
completely to see any connection between the statute as 
cited in the said instruction No. 6 with the charge 
of bribery as set forth. in the indictment and presented 
at the trial. It may well have been error for the court 
to give such instruction; we see no error in the court's 
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refusing to do so. 
We respectfully subn1it that defendant's assignment 
of error No. 40 does not present an issue to this court. 
The exception is quoted as follows : 
'·The court erred in giving the instructions to the 
jury as given by the court and to the whole thereof 
for the reason and on the ground that the same do 
not contain a complete statement of the law and mat-
ters upon which the jury must, of necessity, have 
been instructed in the case and upon the evidence 
as received by the court and permitted to go to the 
jury and introduced by the State over the objections 
of the defendant, and the limitation and extent to 
which said evidence might be considered by the 
jury, particularly with respect to the numerous and 
diverse matters of hearsay and conversations be-
tween Cyrus V. Lack, the witness, and several per-
sons called as witnesses and otherwise, and out of 
the presence of the defendant." (Tr. 877) 
We construe this exception as being directed to all the 
instructions to the jury as given. 
In the case of State vs. Warner 291 Pac. 307, 79 U. 
500, this court held that a mere general exception to an 
instruction is unavailing unless the instruction as a whole 
is erroneous. Sec. 105-38-1 Utah Code Annotated 1943, 
provides in part as follows : 
'' • * * Exceptions to instructions to the Jury shall 
be taken and preserved as in ci vii cases. '' 
This court has held in numerous civil cases that a gen-
eral e~ception to an entire charge is insufficient if any 
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portion of it is correct and that an exception to the in-
structions as given should be specific enough to show 
what part of it is considered error. Ryan vs. Beaver 
County, 21 Pac. (2d) 858; 82 U. 27; 89 A. L. R. 1253. 
We submit that the trial court correctly stated the law 
in its instructions and that therefore assignment of error 
No. 40 is not based upon a proper exception. 
The defendant assigns as error (Assignment of er-
or No. 41) the giving of the last paragraph of the court's 
instruction No. 6 (Tr. 44). Instruction No. 6 deals with 
the evidence offered for the purpose of showing that the 
defendant committed other offenses than the one for 
which he stood accused. The court points out that such 
evidence is admitted for a limited purpose only, not to 
prove distil'ct offenses, but only as it bears upon the 
question whether or not the defendant was guilty of the 
crime as charged. The court cautioned that such evi-
dence was to be considered for no other purpos.e and 
then concluded with the allegedly objectionable para-
graph as follows: · 
''The value, if any, of such evidence, depends on 
whether or not it tends to show that the defendant 
entertained the intent which is a necessary element 
. of the alleged crime for which he is now on trial, or 
that there existed in the mind of the defendant a 
plan, scheme, system or design, into which fitted the 
commission of the offense for which he is now on 
trial.'' 
The theory upon which the court instructed was the 
same as that on which the court admitted hearsay evi-
dence to which the defendant objected and now argues 
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as error. The authorities cited heretofore in support of 
the admission of such evidence are, we believe, sufficient 
justification for this instruction. We respectfully submit 
that the last paragraph of the court's instruction No. 6 
is a proper statement of the law. 
PROPOSITION V 
THE COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN DENY-
ING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
Defendant based his motion for a new trial. on the 
statutory grounds set out in Section 105-39-3 Utah Code 
Annotated 1943, although defendant's grounds are num.:. 
bered somewhat differently. Section 105-39-4 Utah Code 
Annotated 1943, requires that affidavits in support of 
the grounds mentioned in subsections ( 2), ( 3), ( 4) and 
(7) of Section 105-39-3 be filed within 30 days after filing 
the notice of motion. Defendant's grounds 1, 2, 3, : ~ and 
10 (Tr. 51), correspond to the grounds mentioned in 
Section 105-39-3 which requires affidavits in support 
thereof. The defendant filed one affidavit only (Tr. 53) 
and that affidavit is in support of grounds 1 and 2 in the 
defendant's motion. We submit that grounds 3, 4 and 10 
are entitled to no consideration whatever by this Hon-
orable Court inasmuch as they are fatally defective. 
Defendant contends that the jury received evidence 
out of court and, as stated, filed an affidavit in support 
thereof signed by his attorney. The sum and substance 
of said affidavit is to the effect that during the course 
of the trial the then Governor of the State of Utah issued 
a statement to the newspapers, said statement being at-
tached to the affidavit. Upon examination of this state-
ment, we can find nothing therein that is prejudicial to 
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the defendant and further, even if it be assumed that 
this statement contained prejudicial matter t~ere has 
been no showing by the defendant that the jury was in-
fluenced thereby. Moreover there has been no showing 
by the defendant that the jury was even aware of this 
statement. 
The remaining grounds urged by the defendant in 
support of his motion for a new trial are that the court 
misdirected the jury in matters of law and that the court 
erred in the decision of questions of law arising during 
the course of the trial, and did, and allowed acts in the 
cause prejudicial to the substantial rights of the defend-
ant, and that the verdict is contrary to the law and to 
the evidence. Any error upon which these grounds are 
based must have been those alleged errors urged by the 
defendant which have been heretofore considered in this 
brief. We feel that the defendant's assignments of error 
are not well taken for the reasons stated hereinbefore. 
We submit that the Court committed no error in deny-
ing the motion for new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant has set out 42 assignments of error in 
his brief. We have chosen to group these assignments 
under several general subject headings, in as much as 
many of the assignments deal with only one proposition 
of law. There are no questions of fact before this Court 
in the case at bar. Appellant has argued that there is in-
sufficient evidence before the Court to sustain the trial 
court's conviction. However, we feel that the authorities 
clearly show that the evidence of a co-conspirator is ad-
missible against the defendant and that it does not need 
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corroboration under the facts of this case. There is abun-
dant evidence in the record to support the conviction of 
the defendant and we sub1nit that the trial court was 
liberal to the defendant in its rulings admitting such 
evidence. 
We urge this Court to sustain the trial court's judg-
ment of conviction. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINTON D. VERNON, 
Attorney General 
ALLEN B. SORENSEN, 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK K. BOYLE, 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent 
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